Run wp-cli as www-data instead of root; drop --allow-root
--allow-root was routing around wp-cli's own safety check rather than addressing why root was there in the first place: docker exec defaults to the container's root user because the image never sets a non-root user for exec sessions — it was never about the actual web-facing attack surface, which already runs as www-data (verified: php-fpm's worker processes, the ones executing plugin/theme code for real requests, run as uid 33, not root; only our own deliberate admin commands were root). wp-config.php and the rest of wp-core are already owned by www-data (the official entrypoint sets this up), so there's no actual reason for our own commands to run as anything else. Verified: a full clean deploy and a bookstore-core wp-cli command both work identically running as www-data, no functional change, just removed an unnecessary privilege. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ gunzip -c "$DB_DUMP" | $COMPOSE exec -T db sh -c "exec mariadb -u\"\$MARIADB_USE
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echo "==> restoring uploads"
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ARCHIVE_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$UPLOADS_ARCHIVE")" && pwd)"
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ARCHIVE_NAME="$(basename "$UPLOADS_ARCHIVE")"
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$COMPOSE run --rm -T -v "${ARCHIVE_DIR}:/restore:ro" wordpress \
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$COMPOSE run --rm -T -u www-data -v "${ARCHIVE_DIR}:/restore:ro" wordpress \
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tar -xzf "/restore/${ARCHIVE_NAME}" -C /var/www/html/wp-content
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echo "==> restore complete — verify the site before treating the drill as passed"
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