4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
twooeyandClaude Sonnet 5 71b8065f20 AO3-style tag browsing: taxonomies, display, Hardcover sync (schema unverified)
Four flat taxonomies attached to product (bsc_genre, bsc_mood,
bsc_content_warning, bsc_tag) reuse WordPress's native taxonomy archive
system for the "click a tag, see everything with it" browsing AO3 is known
for — no custom archive templates or query logic needed. Verified: all
four register correctly, render as clickable chips on the product page
(content warnings get a distinct notice instead of just another chip),
and the archive page + term count both work end-to-end with real test
data.

HardcoverAdapter + `wp bookstore sync-hardcover-tags` pull genre/mood/
content-warning/freeform tags from Hardcover's API to populate these.
This part is explicitly NOT verified against a live response — Hardcover's
API is in beta with informal docs, and there was no API token available
to confirm the exact query/response shape. Flagged clearly in the adapter
itself; needs a real token + introspection query before trusting the
field-parsing logic in production. ISBN-first-then-title/author matching
handles both real future ISBNs and the current Gutenberg-synthetic
catalog's fake ones.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 13:59:30 -04:00
twooeyandClaude Sonnet 5 f65581bc50 Permanently eliminate the "$X variable not set" warning, and fix Caddy auto-HTTPS on private IPs
Two separate leaks were causing the same cosmetic-but-annoying warning to
survive every previous fix attempt:

1. Compose's own `secrets:` block reads the referenced file's *content*
   as part of its config model, and applies the same interpolation
   warning to it — even with DB_PASSWORD fully removed from every ${VAR}
   and --env-file path. Switched from Compose's native `secrets:` to plain
   bind mounts at the same /run/secrets/* paths: a bind mount only ever
   touches the file's path, never its content, so it's immune. (Verified
   this precisely with an isolated repro before rolling it out — the two
   mechanisms behave differently even though they look equivalent.)

2. caddy's `env_file: .env.staging` (a leftover from the since-removed
   basic-auth setup) loaded the *raw*, unfiltered env file directly,
   bypassing deploy.sh/backup.sh/restore.sh's filtered-copy mechanism
   entirely. Caddy only ever needed SITE_DOMAIN; switched to passing that
   one value directly instead of the whole file.

Also fixed Caddyfile.staging: the site address had no explicit scheme, so
Caddy's automatic-HTTPS logic still applied to a private IP (registering
its own internal CA and redirecting HTTP->HTTPS) — not the "plain HTTP
only" behavior I'd assumed and told the user earlier. Prefixed with
`http://` to genuinely disable automatic HTTPS for this LAN-only box.

Verified end-to-end: fresh deploy with dollar-sign DB passwords produces
zero warnings, serves HTTP 200 on plain http:// with no redirect, and the
DB connection genuinely authenticates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 11:59:36 -04:00
twooeyandClaude Sonnet 5 3876a6ba30 Fix DB password corruption via Docker secrets file mechanism
The reported bug (a generated password containing "$BRjTx3tlmSpz" got
silently blanked, breaking the DB connection) is the same Compose
interpolation issue as the earlier bcrypt hash, but this time in fields
that are genuinely user-chosen and can't just be avoided by convention.

Switched DB_PASSWORD/DB_ROOT_PASSWORD to Docker's official `_FILE`
secrets convention (MARIADB_PASSWORD_FILE / WORDPRESS_DB_PASSWORD_FILE),
backed by Compose's native `secrets:` mechanism: deploy.sh writes the raw
value to secrets/<env>/db_password, and the container reads that file
directly — the value never passes through Compose's ${VAR} interpolation
at all. Verified end-to-end with an actual `$`-containing password,
including a full deploy → backup → restore → still-serving round trip.

Also fixed along the way (found while actually testing, not assumed):
- Makefile never exported ENVIRONMENT, so `make up` alone (bypassing
  deploy.sh) would have left the new secrets path unresolved.
- deploy.sh chmod'd the secret files 600, unreadable by the container's
  own UID (www-data) — fixed to 644, relying on the containing directory
  (700) to keep other host users out instead.
- backup.sh/restore.sh still called `mysqldump`/`mysql`, which don't
  exist in the mariadb:11 image under those names — renamed to
  mariadb-dump/mariadb. (This means neither script had actually
  succeeded before now; both are verified working end-to-end here.)

The supplier/payment API keys remain passed the old way — nothing reads
them yet (bookstore-core is still a stub), so there's no live bug to fix
there; noted in .env.example that the same _FILE pattern should be used
once that code exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 11:36:29 -04:00
twooeyandClaude Sonnet 5 c9d637c907 Week 1 infrastructure: Docker environments, deploy pipeline, bookstore-core scaffold
Docker Compose environments for dev/staging/production (MariaDB, Redis,
Caddy, Action Scheduler cron sidecar), an idempotent deploy script,
git-hook-based deploy pipeline, backup/restore scripts, and the
bookstore-core plugin stub with WooCommerce HPOS compatibility declared.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 09:50:18 -04:00