Two separate leaks were causing the same cosmetic-but-annoying warning to
survive every previous fix attempt:
1. Compose's own `secrets:` block reads the referenced file's *content*
as part of its config model, and applies the same interpolation
warning to it — even with DB_PASSWORD fully removed from every ${VAR}
and --env-file path. Switched from Compose's native `secrets:` to plain
bind mounts at the same /run/secrets/* paths: a bind mount only ever
touches the file's path, never its content, so it's immune. (Verified
this precisely with an isolated repro before rolling it out — the two
mechanisms behave differently even though they look equivalent.)
2. caddy's `env_file: .env.staging` (a leftover from the since-removed
basic-auth setup) loaded the *raw*, unfiltered env file directly,
bypassing deploy.sh/backup.sh/restore.sh's filtered-copy mechanism
entirely. Caddy only ever needed SITE_DOMAIN; switched to passing that
one value directly instead of the whole file.
Also fixed Caddyfile.staging: the site address had no explicit scheme, so
Caddy's automatic-HTTPS logic still applied to a private IP (registering
its own internal CA and redirecting HTTP->HTTPS) — not the "plain HTTP
only" behavior I'd assumed and told the user earlier. Prefixed with
`http://` to genuinely disable automatic HTTPS for this LAN-only box.
Verified end-to-end: fresh deploy with dollar-sign DB passwords produces
zero warnings, serves HTTP 200 on plain http:// with no redirect, and the
DB connection genuinely authenticates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
114 lines
5.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
114 lines
5.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Builds and brings up an environment, then makes sure WordPress/WooCommerce
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# are installed and configured to match design doc §01/§03/§07. Safe to run
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# repeatedly — every step is idempotent.
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set -euo pipefail
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ENVIRONMENT="${1:?Usage: deploy.sh <dev|staging|production>}"
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export ENVIRONMENT
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REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
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cd "$REPO_ROOT"
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case "$ENVIRONMENT" in
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dev|staging|production) ;;
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*) echo "environment must be 'dev', 'staging', or 'production'" >&2; exit 1 ;;
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esac
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ENV_FILE=".env.${ENVIRONMENT}"
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if [[ ! -f "$ENV_FILE" ]]; then
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echo "missing $ENV_FILE — copy .env.example to $ENV_FILE and fill it in" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# shellcheck source=lib/env.sh
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source "$REPO_ROOT/deploy/lib/env.sh"
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SITE_URL="$(env_get "$ENV_FILE" SITE_URL)"
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SITE_TITLE="$(env_get "$ENV_FILE" SITE_TITLE)"
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WP_ADMIN_USER="$(env_get "$ENV_FILE" WP_ADMIN_USER)"
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WP_ADMIN_PASSWORD="$(env_get "$ENV_FILE" WP_ADMIN_PASSWORD)"
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WP_ADMIN_EMAIL="$(env_get "$ENV_FILE" WP_ADMIN_EMAIL)"
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# DB_PASSWORD/DB_ROOT_PASSWORD are stripped from what Compose itself loads:
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# Compose scans every value in --env-file for $identifier-looking patterns
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# as part of building its own interpolation table, and warns "variable not
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# set" for any it finds — even though nothing consumes these two via ${VAR}
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# anymore (they only flow through secrets/, via env_get below, which reads
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# the real, unfiltered $ENV_FILE directly). Filtering them out of Compose's
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# copy is what makes that warning actually go away, permanently, regardless
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# of what characters end up in either password.
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COMPOSE_ENV_FILE="$(mktemp)"
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trap 'rm -f "$COMPOSE_ENV_FILE"' EXIT
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grep -Ev '^(DB_PASSWORD|DB_ROOT_PASSWORD)=' "$ENV_FILE" > "$COMPOSE_ENV_FILE"
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# -p pins the Compose project name to the environment (default is the
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# directory name, which every environment shares — that made staging quietly
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# reuse dev's db_data volume/credentials the first time this ran).
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COMPOSE="docker compose -p bookstore-${ENVIRONMENT} -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.${ENVIRONMENT}.yml --env-file ${COMPOSE_ENV_FILE}"
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echo "==> writing DB secret files (bypasses compose's \${VAR} interpolation entirely)"
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SECRETS_DIR="secrets/${ENVIRONMENT}"
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mkdir -p "$SECRETS_DIR"
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chmod 700 "secrets" "$SECRETS_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true
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DB_PASSWORD_VALUE="$(env_get "$ENV_FILE" DB_PASSWORD)"
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DB_ROOT_PASSWORD_VALUE="$(env_get "$ENV_FILE" DB_ROOT_PASSWORD)"
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: "${DB_PASSWORD_VALUE:?set DB_PASSWORD in ${ENV_FILE}}"
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: "${DB_ROOT_PASSWORD_VALUE:?set DB_ROOT_PASSWORD in ${ENV_FILE}}"
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printf '%s' "$DB_PASSWORD_VALUE" > "$SECRETS_DIR/db_password"
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printf '%s' "$DB_ROOT_PASSWORD_VALUE" > "$SECRETS_DIR/db_root_password"
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# 644, not 600: the db/wordpress/cron containers read this as their own
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# (non-host-matching) container UID, e.g. www-data — chmod 600 made it
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# unreadable to them. The containing directory (700, above) is what
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# actually keeps other host users out; these just need to be world-readable
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# within that already-restricted directory.
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chmod 644 "$SECRETS_DIR/db_password" "$SECRETS_DIR/db_root_password"
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echo "==> building and starting ${ENVIRONMENT}"
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$COMPOSE up -d --build
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echo "==> waiting for WordPress core files (the official image copies them in on first boot of an empty volume, which takes a few seconds)"
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for i in $(seq 1 60); do
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if $COMPOSE exec -T wordpress test -f /var/www/html/wp-settings.php >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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break
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fi
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if [[ "$i" -eq 60 ]]; then
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echo "wordpress core files did not appear in time" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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sleep 2
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done
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echo "==> ensuring WordPress is installed"
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if ! $COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp core is-installed --allow-root; then
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$COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp core install \
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--url="${SITE_URL:?set SITE_URL in ${ENV_FILE}}" \
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--title="${SITE_TITLE:-Bookstore}" \
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--admin_user="${WP_ADMIN_USER:?set WP_ADMIN_USER in ${ENV_FILE}}" \
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--admin_password="${WP_ADMIN_PASSWORD:?set WP_ADMIN_PASSWORD in ${ENV_FILE}}" \
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--admin_email="${WP_ADMIN_EMAIL:?set WP_ADMIN_EMAIL in ${ENV_FILE}}" \
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--skip-email \
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--allow-root
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fi
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echo "==> installing/activating theme (Blocksy — free; Book Store starter site needs a manual license + import, see README)"
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$COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp theme install blocksy --activate --allow-root
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echo "==> installing/activating required plugins"
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$COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp plugin install woocommerce redis-cache blocksy-companion --activate --allow-root
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$COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp plugin activate bookstore-core --allow-root
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$COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp redis enable --allow-root || true
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echo "==> enabling WooCommerce HPOS (custom order tables)"
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$COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp option update woocommerce_custom_orders_table_enabled yes --allow-root
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$COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp option update woocommerce_custom_orders_table_data_sync_enabled yes --allow-root
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if [[ "$ENVIRONMENT" != "production" ]]; then
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echo "==> discouraging search engines (non-production)"
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$COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp option update blog_public 0 --allow-root
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fi
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echo "==> flushing caches and rewrite rules"
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$COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp cache flush --allow-root
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$COMPOSE exec -T wordpress wp rewrite flush --allow-root
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echo "==> deploy complete: ${ENVIRONMENT}"
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